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Human Relations
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Terrorism: A Positive Feedback Game

Mary Douglas

Oxford

Gerald Mars

Cambridge and the London School of Economics, marsgerry{at}aol.com

This article offers an approach to political systems in enclaves (i.e. closed, dissident minorities) from the standpoint of Cultural Theory; it seeks to identify different kinds of organized dissent, as well as the constraints facing them, most especially those deriving from manipulation and control of information. In this latter case, the resulting choices have implications with regard to both structure and behaviour, which defy all explanations that are based exclusively on the personalities of members or leaders. This approach provides a means of classifying and subdividing enclaves, and proposes, in so doing, a bimodal developmental schema with four forks. The first fork examines demographic security: it focuses on concerns regarding defection, and on the means of controlling information. The second considers internal organization, as well as alternatives to defection. The third fork, on external relations, looks into the alternative steps that are available in order to control factionalism and negotiations with the outside. Finally, the fourth fork explores the availability and control of resources (funds as well as military equipment), and the different effects these have on central vs. peripheral autonomy, as well as with regard to the nature of reconciliation. A close examination of how information is shaped by institutions shows that the behaviour and personal attitudes of enclavists are largely defined by the constraints imposed on the options that are available to them. It is not the personalities of members but these constraints that ultimately channel their understanding.

Key Words: defection • enclaves • factionalism • information • reconciliation • terrorism

Human Relations, Vol. 56, No. 7, 763-786 (2003)
DOI: 10.1177/00187267030567001


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