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Ethnography and Sister Sciences: Why Refuse Assistance? A Reply to Weeks

University of Nevada, Las Vegas, tjones{at}nevada.edu

Social scientists (most recently John Weeks) tend to reply to arguments about epistemological difficulties for belief ascription with two responses. An epistemological response goes: Behavioral evidence for underlying beliefs `is all we have and all we need'. A metaphysical response argues that beliefs, being merely instrumental entities are not really subject to worries about underdetermination. In this article, I argue that these responses are inadequate, and that social science practice can be greatly improved by incorporating cognitive-science constraints into the practice of ascribing beliefs.

Key Words: belief ascription • cognitive science • ethnography

Human Relations, Vol. 53, No. 3, 299-310 (2000)
DOI: 10.1177/0018726700533001


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