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Ethnography, Belief Ascription, and Epistemological Barriers

University of Neveda, San Diego, tjones{at}nevada.edu

While ascribing beliefs to one's subjects is a common practice for most ethnographers, I argue that this task is far more difficult and error-prone than commonly realized. I lay out the fundamental epistemological problems for belief ascribers and explain why certain sorts of ascriptions are especially difficult to make accurately. I suggest some guidelines for making ethnographic belief ascription less error-prone.

Key Words: ascription • belief • epistemology • ethnography • sociology

Human Relations, Vol. 53, No. 1, 117-152 (2000)
DOI: 10.1177/0018726700531006


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